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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jace Stoney Thompson appeals from the district court's orders revoking 
his probation and ordering execution of his sentences. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In May 2007, in Case No. CR-07-03909, the state charged Thompson with 
burglary and felony eluding after he broke into a private residence and then led 
police on a high speed chase when they attempted to detain him. (#39515 R., 
pp.15-18, 24-25, 38-39, 41-42.) Once police were able to stop Thompson, they 
discovered a handgun and a bag of coins in his car, which Thompson admitted 
stealing from another residence. (#39515 R., pp.17-18.) Thompson pied guilty 
to both the burglary and eluding charges and the court imposed a unified five-
year sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (#39515 R., pp.43, 
48-50.) Following the retained jurisdiction review period, the court suspended 
Thompson's sentence and placed him on probation. (#39515 R., pp.61-65.) 
Seven months later, on September 23, 2008, the state filed a Report of 
Probation Violation alleging Thompson violated his probation by absconding 'from 
supervision. (#39515 R., pp.67-68.) The state subsequently withdrew the 
violation upon learning Thompson was incarcerated in Washington. (#39515 R., 
p.69.) 
On May 21, 2010, Thompson's probation officer asked the court to 
discharge Thompson from supervision noting Thompson had paid all applicable 
fees, had "not had any significant violations of his probation," and had "completed 
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New Directions Aftercare." (#39515 R., p.77; also pp.78-79.) The court 
granted the request and placed Thompson on unsupervised probation. (#39515 
R., pp.78-79.) 
Six months later, in November 2010, in Case No. CR-2010-09611, the 
state charged Thompson with burglary after he broke into an elementary school 
where he was discovered with a camera that belonged to one of the teachers. 
(#39504 R., pp.10-17, 54.) Thompson's new criminal charge in Case No. CR-
2010-09611 also served as the basis for a probation violation allegation in Case 
No. CR-2007-3909, which violation Thompson ultimately admitted. (#39515 R., 
pp.81-82, 101.) The state also filed a Report of Unsupervised Probation 
Violation on December 20, 2010, alleging an additional violation - that Thompson 
consumed alcohol. (#39515 R., pp.103-104.) Thompson admitted this violation 
as well after which the court revoked his probation, ordered his sentence 
executed, and retained jurisdiction. (#39515 R., pp.117, 123-125.) 
Thompson later pied guilty to the burglary charge in Case No. CR-2010-
09611 and the court imposed a unified six-year sentence with three years fixed 
and ordered the sentence to run concurrent with Thompson's sentence in Case 
No. CR-2007-3909, and retained jurisdiction as it did in Case No. CR-2007-3909. 
(#39504 R., pp.63, 71-73.) At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction review 
period, the court suspended Thompson's sentences in both cases and placed 
him on probation. (#39515 R., pp.133-136; #39504 R., pp.84-89.) 
Less than two months after the court placed Thompson on probation, the 
state filed a Report of Probation Violation alleging Thompson violated his 
2 
probation by consuming alcohol and committing new crimes. (#39515 R., 
pp.138-139; #39504 R., pp.90-91.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the court 
found Thompson violated his probation as alleged by the state. (#39515 R., 
p.159; #39504 R., p.111.) On November 17, 2011, the court revoked 
Thompson's probation in both cases and ordered his sentences executed. 
(#39515 R., pp.163-165; #39504 R., pp.115-117.) Thompson filed a timely 
notice of appeal in both cases. (#39515 R., pp.172-174; #39504 R., pp.124-
126.) 
Thompson filed a motion to consolidate his cases on appeal, which the 
Idaho Supreme Court granted. (Motion to Consolidate Nos. 39504 & 39515, 
Order Granting Motion to Consolidate dated April 5, 2012.) 
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ISSUES 
Thompson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Thompson due 
process and equal protection when it denied his Motions to 
Augment the record with various transcripts from the prior 
proceedings of his cases, and which contained information 
relevant to his appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. 
Thompson's probation or, alternatively, by not reducing it sua 
sponte pursuant to Rule 35. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Thompson failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated 
his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record 
with five irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Thompson failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 




Thompson Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motions To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Thompson filed motions to augment 
with seven unprepared transcripts. (Docket No. 39515, Motion To Augment And 
To Suspend The Briefing Schedule and Statement In Support Thereof, filed 
March 26, 2012 ("Motion I"); Docket No. 39504, Motion To Augment And To 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed March 
26, 2012 (hereinafter "Motion II").) The requested transcripts included (1) the 
July 26, 2007 change of plea hearing and the September 20, 2007 sentencing 
hearing in Case No. CR-2007-3909 (Motion I); (2) the December 15, 2010 
change of plea hearing and the February 9, 2011 sentencing hearing in Case No. 
CR-2010-09611 (Motion II, p.1 ); (3) .the July 6, 2011 retained jurisdiction review 
hearing (Motion II, p.1); and (4) the November 2, 2011 1 admit/deny hearing and 
the November 16, 2011 probation violation disposition hearing (Motion II, pp.1-2). 
The state filed an objection to Thompson's motion requesting augmentation with 
the two transcripts from 2007 and an objection to Thompson's request for the 
transcripts from proceedings held on December 15, 2010, February 9, 2011, and 
1 Thompson's motion incorrectly referenced the date of this hearing as November 
3, 2011 (Motion II, p.2), which erroneous reference was repeated in the state's 
objection and the Court's order, however, as noted in Thompson's later motion 
renewing his request to augment the record, the actual date of the hearing was 
November 2, 2011; therefore, all references in this brief will reflect the actual date 
of the hearing. 
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July 6, 2011. (Docket No. 39515 Objection To "Motion To Augment And To 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof," filed March 
28, 2012; Docket No. 39504, Objection In Part To "Motion To Augment And To 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof," filed March 
28, 2012.) The state did not object to Thompson's request for the November 2, 
2011, and November 16, 2011 transcripts. 
The Idaho Supreme Court granted Thompson's request to augment the 
record with transcripts from the hearings held on November 2 and 16, 2011, but 
denied Thompson's request for the remaining transcripts. (Order, dated April 12, 
2012.) Two months later, Thompson filed a Renewed Motion To Augment And 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof ("Renewed 
Motion"). In his Renewed Motion, Thompson noted he obtained a CD-ROM that 
contains "all but one of the transcripts initially requested" and argued the 
"requested items" are "necessary for an adequate record on appeal because they 
all contain specific information relevant to Mr. Thompson's claims on appeal, 
notably potentially-mitigating evidence and statements by the defendant, 
himself."2 (Renewed Motion, p.3.) The state objected to Thompson's Renewed 
Motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court adhered to its original decision denying 
Thompson's motion to augment the record with additional transcripts. (Objection 
To "Renewed Motion To Augment And Suspend the Briefing Schedule And 
Statement In Support Thereof," 'filed June 26, 2012; Order Denying Renewed 
2 Although the CD does not include one of the transcripts Thompson has 
requested, he nevertheless renewed his request for augmentation with that 
transcript, asserting "it is reasonable to presume that this transcript would also 
contain relevant information as well." (Renewed Motion, p.3 n.3.) 
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Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule," dated July 10, 
2012.) 
Thompson now contends that, by denying his motions to augment the 
appellate record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has 
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-
16.) Thompson has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights 
because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even relevant 
to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court 
has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, 
Thompson Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Orders Denying His Motions To Augment 
In State v. Morgan, 2012 WL 2782599 (Idaho App. July 10, 2012), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals considered a claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
the appellant his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the 
record on appeal with various transcripts. In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any 
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authority to review, and, in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision 
made on a motion made prior to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of 
Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court decision was contrary to the 
state or federal constitutions or other law." Morgan at* 2. Such an undertaking, 
the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining 
an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the 
purview of this Court." lit The Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority . 
. . to evaluate and rule on [a] renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed 
appellant's brief and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded 
issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for additional records 
or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." 
1ft To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Thompson's 
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho 
Supreme Court's orders denying his motions to augment the record with 
additional transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. 
Thompson claims otherwise, arguing that, even if this case is assigned to 
the Court of Appeals, he would not be asking the Court of Appeals to "review or 
overrule the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court made in regard to the decision 
to augment the record." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) "Rather," Thompson claims, "he 
is asserting that certain, now-final, decisions made during the appellate review 
process deprived him of certain constitutional rights during his appeal." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Exactly how Thompson thinks this assertion negates the 
Court of Appeals' statement in Morgan regarding the limitation on its ability to 
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review a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court is unclear. As noted in Morgan, 
the Court of Appeals' authority only allows it to "evaluate and rule on [a] renewed 
motion" if, for example, "the completed appellant's brief and/or respondent's 
briefs have refined, clarified or expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to 
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where new 
evidence is presented to support a renewed motion." Morgan at *2. The Court of 
Appeals cannot exercise such authority in this case because the Idaho Supreme 
Court has already ruled on Thompson's Renewed Motion and Thompson has not 
"refined, clarified or expanded [the] issues on appeal in such a way as to 
demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts," nor has he presented 
new evidence to support renewing his motion to augment yet again. Instead, 
assuming the case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, he is asking the Court to 
re-evaluate the relevancy argument that was already presented to and rejected 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. As stated in Morgan, the Court of Appeals has no 
authority to do so. 
D. If This Court Considers The Merits Of Thompson's Constitutional Claims, 
He Has Failed To Establish Any Of His Rights Have Been Violated 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Thompson's constitutional 
claims, all of his arguments fail. As in Morgan, Thompson argues that he is 
entitled to the additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide 
them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, 
and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp .10-16.) 
All of Thompson's arguments lack merit. 
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"A defendant in a criminal case only has a due process right to a record 
on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." Morgan at *2 (citing cases, internal quotations 
omitted.) Thompson's appeals are timely only from the district court's November 
17, 2011 orders revoking probation and ordering his sentences executed. The 
transcripts of the proceedings related to that revocation decision are included in 
the record on appeal and are more than adequate to evaluate the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. (See generally 11/2/2011 Tr. (evidentiary hearing), 
11/16/2011 Tr. (disposition hearing}.} Further, the information cited by the district 
court in reaching its decision is also contained in the record. (Compare 
11/16/2011 Tr., p.84, L.6 - p.85, L.14, p.105, L.12 p.109, L.22 (reciting 
Thompson's history on probation and the reasons the court finally revoked 
probation without retaining jurisdiction} with #39515 R. and #39504 R. (includes 
probation violation pleadings and minutes}.) The record also contains the 
presentence report prepared in Thompson's 2007 case and the 2011 APSI. (See 
Exhibits.) 
Thompson nevertheless contends this information is inadequate for 
appellate review because, he argues, the additional transcripts are "relevant for 
the simple reason that a diligent district judge would review the file, as well as 
any potentially-relevant audio hearings [sicJ, if he could not remember what he 
had heard at those prior hearings, in order to sufficiently consider the evidence 
before ruling on the sentencing issues." (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.) That 
Thompson has identified excerpts from transcripts of prior proceedings, which 
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are not included in the appellate record, and that he believes provide mitigating 
information about him (Appellant's Brief, p.8), does not mean the transcripts are 
necessary for adequate review of the district court's revocation decision. If 
Thompson thought that information was critical to the court's revocation decision, 
he should have presented it to the court at the November 16, 2011 disposition 
hearing. Indeed, contrary to appellate counsel's implication otherwise, the record 
reveals that much of the information identified in the Renewed Motion that he 
deems so critical to a disposition decision is already included in the appellate 
record. (Compare PSI, pp.9-10 (regarding Thompson's difficult childhood) with 
Renewed Motion, pp.11-12, i19.a. (same); compare #39515 R., pp.123-125 and 
#39504 R., pp.71-73 (second period of retained jurisdiction ordered in February 
2011) with Renewed Motion, p.12, i'li'l 9.c.-d. (discussion of appropriateness of 
ordering second period of retained jurisdiction in February 2011 ); compare Letter 
from Jace Stoney Thompson dated November 2, 2011 (Exhibit) and 11/6/2011 
Tr., p.100, L.22 - p.105, L.11 (Thompson's statements at disposition regarding 
difficulty with addiction and desire to be available to care for his daughter) with 
Renewed Motion, pp.12-13, i'li'l 9.e.-g. (highlighting Thompson's prior statements 
regarding alcohol addiction and desire to be available to care for his daughter)). 
Further, Thompson's suggestion that the district court was required to sua 
sponte listen to "potentially-relevant audio hearings [sic]" and ascertain whether 
Thompson previously presented some mitigating evidence before deciding 
whether to revoke probation or reduce Thompson's sentences upon revocation is 
not only contrary to logic and reality, it is unsupported by law. Cf. Idaho State 
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Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, _, 283 P.3d 96, 103 (2012) ("this Court will not 
search the record on appeal for unspecified error"); United States v. Dunkel, 927 
F.2d 955, 956 (?1h Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried 
in briefs."). State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009), upon 
which Thompson relies, does not hold otherwise. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) 
In Hanington, the Court of Appeals stated that, in reviewing a sentence 
that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, the Court "will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 
judgment" and review is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the 
revocation of probation." 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. This language from 
Hanington does not require augmentation with transcripts of all hearings from 
sentencing to the final revocation. As explained in Morgan, such an 
interpretation of Hanington is too broad. Morgan at *3. The Court clarified that 
although it "will not arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after 
sentencing to the time of the revocation of probation ... that does not mean that 
al/ proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane." ~ 
(emphasis original). Rather, "[tJhe focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying 
the trial court's decision to revoke probation." ~ Accordingly, the Court "will 
consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the 
revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on 
appeal." ~ Because all relevant information is already included in the record 
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on appeal, Thompson has failed to show any due process violation resulting from 
the Supreme Court's orders denying his requests for augmentation. 
Thompson's equal protection argument also lacks merit. The Court in 
Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of 
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating: 
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency. 
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the 
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for 
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the 
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions 
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's 
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his 
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to 
augment the record, precluded him from including the first 
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's 
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant, 
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested. 
Morgan at *4. Thompson's equal protection claim fails for the same reasons. 
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a 
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective 
assistance of counsel. Morgan at *4. Thompson, like Morgan, "has failed to 
demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not possible without the 
requested transcripts." & 
All of Thompson's claims relating to the denial of his motions to augment 
the record fail. 
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11. 
Thompson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Thompson argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking 
probation "in light of his successes on probation and in the rider programs, as 
well as his acceptance into Freedom Place." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) 
Thompson also argues that, for these same reasons, the district court abused its 
discretion by not reducing his sentences upon revocation. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.18-19.) Both of these arguments fail to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
C. Thompson Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Revoking His Probation 
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on 
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty, 
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994). An abuse of 
discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason. !f:l 
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 
506, 510, 9Q3 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of 
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether 
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the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued 
probation is consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 
529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Any cause satisfactory to the court, 
which indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify 
revocation. Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. Contrary to Thompson's 
assertions on appeal, a review of the record shows the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in revoking Thompson's probation. 
In deciding to revoke Thompson's probation, the district court reasoned: 
I have had you on probation twice. On the first sentence you 
eventually violate that sentence by commission of this second 
burglary and it's a real -- it was a real burglary. We are talking 
about a nighttime entry into a school, so very serious offense 
violating a probation that you are already on for a previous burglary 
charge. And neither of these offenses are -- alcohol is not a part of 
either of these offenses but it's certainly a contributing factor that as 
a driver I think behind these offenses. And I think for a long time 
you should have been in a position to know that for you and a lot of 
other people consuming alcohol leads to some of these other poor 
decisions and ultimately offenses for which you create victims 
within the community and demonstrates obviously very bad 
judgment on your part because it's the first step where the 
judgment comes in and that's the decision to consume alcohol. 
Here these latest probation violations maybe if it was just 
alcohol, that would be one thing and I might be facing a little 
different situation, but it was more than that. You were observed at 
a local business trying to force entry into the business, ultimately 
found in a vehicle at that business. And nobody can really know 
what your intention was in that. I know that you have explained that 
you were needing someplace to sleep and maybe that's plausible, 
maybe it's not. But what we know is you were there, someplace 
you shouldn't have been, you had been consuming alcohol, and 
again there was a potential for another victim to be created within 
the community. 
When I put somebody on probation, Mr. Thompson, I'm 
telling the community that I trust that person to be on probation, and 
I trust that person to be within the community and he's not going to 
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bring any further harm to that community. Here, as I have said, I 
have you on probation a couple of times and you have violated that 
and abused that trust that I have put in you, and I have to have 
some credibility in the community that I live in too for probationers. 
(11/6/2011 Tr., p.105, L.15-p.1O7, L.8.) 
As illustrated by the district court's comments, Thompson's probation was 
clearly not achieving the goal of rehabilitation nor was it at all consistent with the 
protection of society. The court's findings in this regard were more than 
adequate to justify revocation. That Thompson may have been successful on 
probation at one point does not compel a contrary conclusion nor do Thompson's 
successes in the retained jurisdiction program. If anything, that Thompson 
performed well during the retained jurisdiction program demonstrates that 
incarceration is precisely what is appropriate to address Thompson's compliance 
issues. 
As for Thompson's claim that revocation was not appropriate given his 
acceptance into the Freedom Place program, which he claims was better 
designed to address his addiction issues than any of the previous programming 
he received (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-21 ), the district court specifically addressed 
this request: 
I'm familiar with Freedom Place and I'm familiar with some of 
the individuals that both work there and are living there, and I'm -- I 
think it's a fine program, I'm glad we have it, and I think it is doing 
well in these early stages and I hope it continues. Unfortunately for 
me at this point in time, Mr. Thompson, I just feel that this option for 
you has come too late and you needed to pay attention to the 
opportunities that you had previously, and I'm not going to be able 
to incorporate this as part of my disposition today. 
(11/6/2011 Tr., p.108, Ls.11-21.) 
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That the district court did not accept Thompson's proposed alternative to 
incarceration does not, as Thompson claims, mean the district court did not 
adequately consider that option or that it "insufficiently" considered Thompson's 
rehabilitative potential, particularly given the requirement that continued 
probation be consistent with the protection of society. The record establishes the 
district court acted well within its discretion in revoking Thompson's probation. 
D. Thompson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentences Upon Revocation 
Thompson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it failed to 
reduce his sentence upon revoking probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-23.) In 
support of this argument, Thompson relies on the same rationale he offered in 
claiming the district abused its discretion in revoking his probation. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.23.) Because Thompson failed to establish error in the revocation of his 
probation, he has likewise failed to show the district court should have sua 
sponte reduced either of his sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders revoking Thompson's probation and executing his sentences without 
reduction. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2012. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of November, 2012, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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